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Physician-Assisted Suicide in the
Context of Managed Care
Susan M. Wolf*
The debate about whether to legalize physician-assisted sui-
cide in the United States,' and indeed whether the federal Con-
stitution bars state bans on the practice,2 largely ignores the
health care context in which the practice would occur. Increas-
ingly, that context is managed care. Over sixty million Ameri-
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1. See, e.g., NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, WHEN DEATH IS
SOUGHT: ASSISTED SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA IN THE MEDICAL CONTEXT (1994); JAMEs
RACHELS, THE END OF LIFE (1986); Yale Kamisar, Against Physician-Assisted Suicide-
Even a Very Limited Form, 72 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 735 (1995); Leon R. Kass, Neither
for Love nor Money: Why Doctors Must Not Kill, PUB. INTEREST, Winter 1989, at 25;
Timothy E. Quill et al., Care of the Hopelessly Ill: Proposed Clinical Criteria for Physi-
cian-Assisted Suicide, 327 NEw ENGL. J. MED. 1380 (1992); Susan M. Wolf, Gender, Femi-
nism, and Death: Physician-Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia, in FamsmsM & BIOETHICS:
BEYOND REPRODUCTION 282 (Susan M. Wolf ed. 1996). See generally Ezekiel J. Emanuel,
Euthanasia: Historical, Ethical, and Empiric Perspectives, 154 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED.
1890 (1994) (including physician-assisted suicide); Ezekiel J. Emanuel, The History of
Euthanasia Debates in the United States and Britain, 121 ANNALs INTERNAL MED. 793
(1994).
2. See, e.g., Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996), en
banc, cert. granted, Washington v. Glucksberg, 65 U.S.L.W. 3254 (U.S. Oct. 1, 1996) (No.
96-110); Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. granted, Vacco v. Quill, 65
U.S.L.W. 3254 (U.S. Oct. 1, 1996) (No. 95-1858); People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714
(Mich. 1994); RONALD DwoREIN, LIFE's DOINmoN: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION,
EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM (1993); Yale Kamisar, Are Laws Against Assisted
Suicide Unconstitutional?, HASTINGS CENTER REP., May-June 1993, at 35; Seth F.
Kreimer, Does Pro-Choice Mean Pro-Kevorkian? An Essay on Roe, Casey, and the Right to
Die, 44 AM. U. L. REv. 803 (1995); Sylvia A. Law, Physician-Assisted Death: An Essay on
Constitutional Rights and Remedies, 55 MD. L. REV. 292 (1996); Susan M. Wolf, Physi-
cian-Assisted Suicide, Abortion, and Treatment Refusal: Using Gender to Analyze the Dif-
ference, in PHYSICIAN-ASISTED SUICIDE: ETHICS, MEDICAL PRACTICE, AND PUBLIC POLICY
(Robert Weir ed., forthcoming 1997).
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cans receive care through health maintenance organizations
("HMOs"). In states heavily penetrated by HMOs, over 30% of
the state population with health insurance may be enrolled in an
HMO.4 HMOs are only one kind of managed care organization
("MCO"); preferred provider organizations ("PPOs") and point-of-
service plans are two others, both of which allow patients some
access to off-plan physicians at increased cost. These three forms
of MCO together account for over half of the health insurance
market. 5 Both Medicare and Medicaid are now embracing man-
aged care for covered individuals.8 Even outside of MCOs, fee-
for-service indemnity plans increasingly use some managed care
techniques to control costs. Indeed, only 4% of the health insur-
ance market remains unmanaged fee-for-service. v Between the
rise of MCOs and spread of their techniques, managed care has
become pervasive.
This forces consideration of how cost-containment efforts and
other features of managed care would affect the use of assisted
suicide" if it were legalized. An emerging literature expresses
considerable anxiety at the prospect.' Sulmasy notes that
3. See Robert Pear, Stakes High as California Debates Ballot Issues to Rein in
H.M.O.'s, N.Y. Tunms, Oct. 3, 1996, at Al, All (noting that "more than 60 million Ameri-
cans now in H.M.O.'s and 90 million in other forms of managed care"); see also GROUP
HEALTH ASS'N OF AMERICA (GHAA), 1995 NATIONAL DIRECTORY OF HMOs 21, 26, 56 (1995)
[hereinafter GHAA] (over 51 million by year-end 1994); AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION,
TRENDS IN US HEALTH CARE 92 (4th ed. 1995) [hereinafter AMA]. "19.5% of the popula-
tion... were HMO members at year-end 1994." GHAA, supra at 19.
4. See AMA, supra note 3, at 93 (listing five states plus D.C. with over 30% HMO
enrollment in 1993); see also DOROTHY A. JENSEN ET AL., REFORMING THE HEALTH CARE
SYSTEM: STATE PROFILES 1994 at 31 (American Association of Retired Persons (AARP),
1994). "In 14 major metropolitan areas, more than 60% of the employed, insured, and
under-65 population were enrolled in an HMO in 1994." GHAA, supra note 3, at 19.
5. See AMA, supra note 3, at 95 (53% total in 1993); HEALTH INSURANCE ASSOCIA-
TION OF AMERICA (HIAA), SOURCE BOOK OF HEALTH INSURANCE DATA: 1994 at 26 (1995)
(51% in 1993).
6. See, e.g., Diane Rowland & Kristina Hanson, Medicaid: Moving to Managed
Care, HEALTH AFF., Fall 1996, at 150; W. Pete Welch, Growth in HMO Share Of The
Medicare Market, 1989-1994, HEALTH AFF., Fall 1996, at 201.
7. See AMA, supra note 3, at 95 (in 1993, 43% of the health insurance market was
managed fee-for-service and 4% was unmanaged; in 1988, the numbers were 42% and
29% respectively).
8. Throughout this article, "assisted suicide" shall mean physician-assisted sui-
cide. This is the form of assisted suicide litigated in Compassion in Dying and Quill.
This author does not here consider suicide assisted by a family member or other non-
physician.
9. See Leonard M. Fleck, Just Caring: Assisted Suicide and Health Care Ration-
ing, 72 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 873 (discussing Sulmasy's argument and coming to differ-
ent conclusions); Tony Smith, Cheap, Managed Death, 310 BRIT. MED. J. 744 (1995)
(noting: "It must be wrong for doctors or other health professionals to have a financial
incentive for their patients to die sooner rather than later."); Donald E. Spencer, Practical
Implications for Health Care Providers in a Physician-Assisted Suicide Environment, 18
SEATTLE U. L. Rv. 545, 550 (1995); Daniel P. Sulmasy, Managed Care and Managed
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assisted suicide and euthanasia "would be... chillingly effective
way[s] to control the costs of managed care."' ° Callahan simi-
larly remarks, "[o]ne's ear does not have to be very close to the
ground to hear it said that legalizing physician-assisted suicide
could help hold down the costs of health care for the elderly.""
Alpers and Lo more specifically worry that "it may serve the
interests of a physician or a managed care plan to provide a
quick and inexpensive lethal prescription rather than palliative
care, which can be emotionally difficult, time consuming, and
expensive."' 2 Other individuals express concern that "pressure
will... be put on the long dying, "13 and that "[1]egalizing physi-
cian-assisted suicide, particularly in a profit-driven system of
managed care, could invite abuses."'4 Moreover, legalizing
assisted suicide could "put the most vulnerable patients at high
risk of involuntary euthanasia.""
To be sure, there are other commentators more sanguine. One
such commentator speculates that MCOs will not encourage
assisted suicide or euthanasia because it would be bad for public
relations and discourage managed care enrollment.' 6 Another
argues that currently "there is no evidence that... [MCOs] are
hastening the deaths of their sickest, highest-cost patients to
save money.' 7 Some commentators are even hopeful that man-
Death, 155 ARcHIVES INTERNAL MED. 133 (1995). The anxiety is not limited to experts. A
cartoon by Don Wright in The Palm Beach Post depicts a physician standing by a
patient's bed and saying to a nurse, "[h]er HMO coverage ran out! They recommend a
physician-assisted suicide!" Reprinted in N.Y. TuMEs, Apr. 14, 1996, §4 (Week in Review),
at 4.
10. Sulmasy, supra note 9, at 135.
11. Daniel Callahan, Controlling the Costs of Health Care for the Elderly-Fair
Means and Foul, 335 NEw ENGL. J. MED. 744, 745 (1996); see also Daniel Callahan, Vital
Distinctions, Mortal Questions: Debating Euthanasia & Health Care Costs, 115 COMMON-
wEAL 397, 399 (1988). Callahan's articles are part of a literature arguing that health care
rationing, whether or not in the context of managed care, carries the danger of pushing
patients and physicians toward assisted suicide and euthanasia. See, e.g., George Dunea,
Thinking the Unthinkable: Rationing and Assisted Suicide, 305 BRrr. MED. J. 720 (1992);
Fleck, supra note 9.
12. Ann Alpers & Bernard Lo, Physician-Assisted Suicide in Oregon: A Bold Exper-
iment, 274 JAMA 483, 484 (1995).
13. Diane Johnson, Assisted Suicide: Where the Law Should Not Tread, L.A.
Tudzs, May 12, 1996, at MI.
14. Bob Groves, U.S. Shouldn't OK Assisted Suicide, Experts Say: Profit Motive
Could Put Patients at Risk, They Warn, BERGEN RECORD, May 18, 1995, at N09.
15. Id.
16. Gordon Slovut, 'U' Researcher Takes on Critics of Managed Care; Minnesota
Citizens Concerned for Life Said Bureaucrats, not Physicians, Are Making Medical Deci-
sions, STAR TRIuNE, June 28, 1996, at 10A (quoting Ezekiel Emanuel).
17. Id. (reporting on comments by Steven Miles). See also Steven Miles, Does
"Managed Care" Endanger Sick People by Denying Life-preserving Care such that Man-
aged Care is a Corporate Form of Involuntary Euthanasia? (1996) (unpublished manu-
script on file with the author).
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aged care can improve dying by discouraging overtreatment,
making sure that providers obey patients' advance directives
that refuse treatment, formulating practice guidelines along
these lines, and overseeing the full range of services a patient
receives. 1
8
With no state having legalized assisted suicide and institution-
alized the practice yet, 9 we have no data in hand to resolve the
issue of how legalized assisted suicide would work in the context
of managed care. Oregon's 1994 legalization of one form of
assisted suicide might have yielded data and permitted managed
care/nonmanaged care comparison, but the statute has been tied
up in litigation and has not yet gone into effect. 20 A recently
reported survey of internists provocatively finds that "physicians
who tend to practice resource conserving medicine are signifi-
cantly more likely... to report a willingness to provide a lethal
prescription at the request of a terminally ill patient."21 Such
early data, however, are primarily an invitation to further
research.
There nonetheless are data from which to piece together the
likely picture. In Part I, this article considers what is known
about the role of physicians in MCOs, and what this predicts for
physicians' involvement in assisted suicide. Managed care typi-
cally imposes on physicians financial and organizational incen-
tives quite different from those in fee-for-service medicine. This
has led to a raging controversy over the ethics that should guide
physicians in managed care. Neither the Compassion in Dying
nor Quill opinion now going to the Supreme Court shows any
awareness of this controversy. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit in Com-
passion in Dying relied on antiquated assumptions about physi-
cians' behavior in order to minimize state interests that might
otherwise support a ban on assisted suicide. Thus, the court
assumed that the state's "strong interest in avoiding undue influ-
ence and other forms of abuse . . . [was] ameliorated in large
18. See Ann Fade & Karen Kaplan, Managed Care and End of Life Decisions, 10
TRENDS HEALTH CAR" L. & ETHIcs 97 (1995); Steven H. Miles et al., End-of-Life Treat-
ment in Managed Care: The Potential and the Peril, 163 W. J. MED. 302 (1995); R. Sean
Morrison & Diane E. Meier, Managed Care At The End Of Life, 10 TRENDS HEALTH CARE
L. & ETHIcS 91 (1995).
19. See ALAN MEISEL, 2 TH RIGHT To DIE 478 (2d ed. 1995); Quill, 80 F.3d at 724.
Oregon is the only state so far to legalize assisted suicide, but litigation has prevented the
statute from going into effect. See infra note 20.
20. OR. REv. STAT. §§ 127.800-.897 (Supp. 1996, part 2); Lee v. Oregon, 869 F.
Supp. 1491 (D. Or. 1994), injunction issued, 891 F. Supp. 1439 (1995), appeal argued, No.
95-35804 (9th Cir. July 9, 1996).
21. B.P. Linas et al., Use of Medical Resources and Physician Willingness to Par-
ticipate in Assisted Suicide (1996) (abstract) (on file with the author).
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measure because of the... involvement... of physicians, who
have a strong bias in favor of preserving life."22 The Ninth Cir-
cuit repeatedly asserted that physicians would "provide. . .[a]
safeguard against abuse," resisting assisted suicide if the
patient's suffering could be alleviated or the patient's situation
could be made tolerable. 23 Based on assumptions about physi-
cians' inclinations, "conservative nature" and ethics,2 4 the court
dismissed the idea that the state's acknowledged interests might
justify a ban.
These unsupported assumptions require close scrutiny in the
era of managed care. In fact, the actual incentives found in
MCOs suggest the Ninth Circuit is wrong. Physicians in man-
aged care may have strong incentives to perform assisted suicide,
rather than to act as a safeguard.
In Part II, this article considers whether MCOs would further
drive patients to assisted suicide through systemic neglect, that
is, failing to respond to the problems that motivate patients to
consider assisted suicide. Numerous studies have reported on
why patients request assisted suicide, both in the United States
and in the Netherlands where assisted suicide and euthanasia
are legally tolerated. 25 Examining the role of a patient's depres-
sion, in particular, allows assessment of how well MCOs deal
with this risk factor now, and thus a prediction as to whether
managed care would propel patients toward assisted suicide.
Finally, in Part III, this article examines how these predic-
tions bear on the constitutional controversy surrounding assisted
suicide now bubbling through the courts, as well as the policy
question of whether to legalize assisted suicide that now faces
legislatures and the electorate.
This article concludes that there is ample reason to suspect
that the dangers of assisted suicide are heightened in managed
care contexts. Yet, there is also reason for caution here. This
analysis is no effort to demonize managed care. Indeed, the arti-
22. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 837.
23. Id. at 826-27.
24. Id. at 827.
25. Assisted suicide and euthanasia remain criminal in the Netherlands, but gen-
erally are not prosecuted when they fall within guidelines articulated by the courts, codi-
fied by the Royal Dutch Medical Association, and subsequently rearticulated in
legislation. For explanation of the legal status of the practices in the Netherlands, see,
e.g., MARGARET PABST BATTIN, A Dozen Caveats Concerning the Discussion of Euthanasia
in the Netherlands, in THE LEAST WORST DEATH: ESSAYS IN BIOETHICS ON THE END OF
LIFE 130-31 (1994). On the most recent statute, see G. I. Kimsa, Infanticide and the
Vulnerable Newborn: The Dutch Debate, 2 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHcARE ETmcs 259 (1993).
In addition, the Northern Territory of Australia has legalized euthanasia and assisted
suicide. On the first euthanasia performed under that new law, see Australian Man First
in World to Die with Legal Euthanasia, N.Y. Tnsxs, Sept. 26, 1996, at A5.
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cle assumes below that many physicians will resist the built-in
incentives. It would be a mistake, however, to ignore the incen-
tives that already exist in managed care and the evidence of
where managed care falls short. The question is whether
assisted suicide should be added to that mix.
A straightforward analysis of the financial incentives imping-
ing on managed care physicians suggests that those incentives
would provide motivation for performing assisted suicide. The
evidence that MCOs do not deal well with depression, the pri-
mary problem leading patients to seek assisted suicide, suggests
that systemic problems would move patients in the direction of
assisted suicide as well. Thus, even if the courts find a constitu-
tionally protected interest in assisted suicide, both of the above-
mentioned factors substantially heighten countervailing state
interests. Indeed, it is difficult to see how states could devise
adequate safeguards in a system increasingly dominated by
managed care. At a minimum, neither the courts' constitutional
analysis nor the legislatures' determination of whether to legal-
ize assisted suicide should proceed without considering the dan-
gers of assisted suicide in the context of managed care.
I. INCENTIVES FOR PHYSICIANS
MCOs combine the insurer and health care provider functions
otherwise kept separate in fee-for-service systems.26 These
organizations thus marry the insurer's cost-consciousness with
the provider's mission of patient care. This grounds the fre-
quently articulated hope that MCOs can be a significant engine
of health care cost containment.
27
In their effort to care for a given population and achieve cost
containment, MCOs can be organized in a variety of ways.2
They also can operate in most states on a for-profit or nonprofit
basis.29 Among the advantages of for-profit MCO status is the
26. See, e.g., ROBERT G. SHOULDICE, INTRODUCTION TO MANAGED CARE 12-13 (rev.
ed. 1991); Marc A. Rodwin, Managed Care and Consumer Protection: What Are the
Issues?, 26 SETON HALL L. Rv. 1007, 1009 n.1 (1996).
27. See, e.g., Michele M. Garvin, Health Maintenance Organizations, HEALTH CARE
CORPORATE LAw: MANAGED CAM 1-4 (Mark A. Hall & William S. Brewbaker III eds.
1996). MCOs are thus a common feature of health care reform proposals. See, e.g., id.;
John K_ Iglehart, The Struggle Between Managed Care and Fee.for-Service Practice, 331
NEW ENGL. J. MED. 63 (1994).
28. Typologies abound. See, e.g., SHOULDICE, supra note 26, at 91-132; Robert E.
Hurley & Deborah A. Freund, A Typology of Medicaid Managed Care, 26 MED. CARE 764
(1988); Jonathan P. Weiner & Gregory de Lissovoy, Razing a Tower of Babel:A Taxonomy
for Managed Care and Health Insurance Plans, 18 J. HEALTH POL. POL'v & L. 74 (1993).
29. See Garvin, supra note 27, at 1-32. Minnesota is one state that requires MCOs
to be nonprofit. See MINN. STAT. §62D.02(4)(a) (1996).
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ability to offer physicians and others ownership interests. As
noted by Garvin, "[pihysician ownership provides the physician
with a financial incentive to manage care and control costs and
also generates physician loyalty to the HMO."3 °
How care will actually be provided and costs actually con-
trolled is determined by a number of arrangements. When an
employer contracts with a MCO to offer care to employees, and
when an individual subscribes to the MCO's health plan, a set of
contracts and relationships will determine what treatments will
be covered. The individual's and employer's contracts with the
MCO and the MCO's contracts with physicians and other provid-
ers all bear on the coverage, against a background of state and
federal requirements. Those arrangements bear not only on cov-
erage, however, but also on what treatments a physician will
even offer to patients, which treatment the physician will enthu-
siastically endorse, the physician's practice style, and the doctor-
patient relationship formed.
This result flows from the range of incentives MCOs impose on
physicians to contain costs."' The foremost incentive is capita-
tion, paying physicians or physician groups a set fee per patient
per year so that excess costs are borne by that physician or
group.32 Capitation places the financial risk of what the MCO
may regard as overtreatment on the physicians treating the
patient. Capitation is meant to create an incentive for physi-
cians to consider treatment costs and to curb their practice styles
in order to minimize costs beyond those that the MCO will fund.
Capitation is coupled with gatekeeping. 33 Each patient must
choose a primary care physician. It is then the responsibility of
the primary care physician to determine when to refer the
patient to other physicians for more specialized care. The
patient's only access to specialists and subspecialists is through
this gatekeeper. With the gatekeeper bearing the brunt of capi-
tation, there is an incentive not to refer patients to specialists.
Other MCO techniques are intended to create further incen-
tives in the same direction. Physicians may receive bonuses for
keeping patient hospitalizations or referrals to specialists below
30. Garvin, supra note 27, at 1-33.
31. For a list of incentives, see Alan L. Hillman et al., How Do Financial Incentives
Affect Physicians' Clinical Decisions and the Financial Performance of Health Mainte-
nance Organizations?, 321 New Engl. J. Med. 86, 88 (1989).
32. See Thomas S. Bodenheimer & Kevin Grumbach, Capitation or Decapitation:
Keeping Your Head in Changing Times, 276 JAMA 1025 (1996); Marsha R. Gold et al., A
National Survey of the Arrangements Managed Care Plans Make with Physicians, 333
NEw ENGL. J. MED. 1678 (1995).
33. See Gold et al., supra note 32.
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a certain level.a4 A portion of physician compensation may be
withheld, with later payment of that portion conditioned on the
physician's meeting the target levels. 5
Physician employment contracts may further contain "gag
clauses" forbidding discussion with patients of treatments off-
plan or not yet approved by the MCO's utilization review office.36
These "gag clauses" may also prohibit physician disclosure of the
physician's arrangements with the MCO and the set of financial
incentives that the MCO has placed on the physician.37 Even
when there is no governing "gag clause," MCO emphasis on cost-
containment has led to a debate about whether physicians
should withhold from patients information about treatment
options not covered by the health plan.38
All of these financial incentives and restrictions39 are also
backed up by the health plan's authority to approve or disap-
prove coverage for treatment. Plans pervasively require utiliza-'
tion review in order to examine treatment prospectively,
concurrently, or retrospectively and determine whether the MCO
will pay for the treatment.4 This creates a mechanism for block-
ing treatment coverage, even if the physician recommends the
treatment. It also forces physicians to decide when to go to bat
for the patient and advocate reversal of coverage denial.4'
Physicians in MCOs thus face profound conflicts of interest.42
Should those physicians serve the individual patient's needs, or
34. See id.
35. See Bodenheimer & Grumbach, supra note 32, at 1027; Gold et al., supra note
32.
36. See Steffie Woolhandler & David Himmelstein, Extreme Risk-The New Corpo-
rate Proposition for Physicians, 333 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 1706 (1995); Robert Pear, The
Tricky Business of Keeping Doctors Quiet, N.Y. Tmas, Sept. 22, 1996, § 4 (Week in
Review), at 7. Sixteen states have thus far banned or limited "gag clauses," with federal
action also being considered by Congress. See Robert Pear, Laws Won't Let H.M.O. 's Tell
Doctors What to Say, N.Y. TiEs, Sept. 17, 1996, at A12.
37. See Pear, The Tricky Business of Keeping Doctors Quiet, supra note 36. The
AMA advocates health plan disclosure of "[a]ny incentives to limit care." See Council on
Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association, Ethical Issues in Managed
Care, 273 JAMA 330, 335 (1995) [hereinafter AMA Report]; see also Douglas F. Levinson,
Toward Full Disclosure of Referral Restrictions and Financial Incentives by Prepaid
Health Plans, 317 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 1729 (1987).
38. Compare Mark A. Hall, Informed Consent to Rationing Decisions, 71 MIBANx
Q. 645 (1993) with Paul S. Appelbaum, Must We Forgo Informed Consent to Control
Health Care Costs? A Response to Mark A Hall, 71 MnBANK Q. 669 (1993).
39. This list is not exhaustive. For others, see, e.g., Gold et al., supra note 32; Marc
A. Rodwin, Conflicts in Managed Care, 332 NEw ENGL. J. MED. 604, 605-06 (1995).
40. See, e.g., SHOULDICE, supra note 26, at 67, 78-82, 178.
41. For discussion of this, see Susan M. Wolf, Health Care Reform and the Future of
Physician Ethics, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Mar.-Apr. 1994, at 28, 35-36.
42. See generally BiDFORD H. GRAY, THE PRoFIT MoTrvE AND PATIENT CARE: THE
CHANGING AccouNTABnrY OF DocroRs AND HosprrALs (1991); MARc A. RoDwIN,
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join the MCO in conserving resources to serve the whole covered
population? Should they seek necessary treatment for each
patient even when it runs contrary to their own financial inter-
ests? In short, should the physicians abandon the traditional
physician commitment to place the needs of the individual
patient above all?
The seriousness of this challenge to the traditional fiduciary
ethics of the doctor-patient relationship and to a relationship
based on patient trust has been widely recognized.43 The Ameri-
can Medical Association ("AMA") urges physicians to continue
placing patient needs above everything else and to reject
arrangements that encourage substandard care." The AMA also
argues that some financial incentives imposed on physicians in
MCOs are unethical.45 Yet, controversy abounds in this arena.
There are no settled answers as to how physicians should act in
MCOs and what incentives MCOs may impose upon physicians.
The debate about physician ethics is matched by debate over
MEDICINE, MONEY, AND MORALS: PHYSICIANS' CONFLICTS OF INTEREST (1993); Alan L. Hill-
man, Financial Incentives for Physicians in HMOs: Is There a Conflict of Interest?, 317
NEW ENGL. J. MED. 1743 (1987).
To be sure, physicians rendering fee-for-service care face financial incentives to
provide more and more treatment. This certainly subjects the patient to the risks of over-
treatment. Yet this does not present the acute conflict of interest seen in MCOs for two
reasons. First, patients' interests generally lie in the direction of receiving access to
treatment. If the physician recommends excessive treatment, the patient can always say
no. This is an imperfect safeguard because the patient may not always be able to tell
what is excessive. However, here is the second reason why fee-for-service care is differ-
ent: the patient can readily grasp that figuring out when to say no is the problem. In
other words, the physician's financial interest in supplying more treatment will usually
be obvious to the patient. In contrast, the patient coming to a MCO physician will simi-
larly expect the physician to place the patient's interests in gaining access to treatment
first, but rarely will arrive understanding the conflicts of interest MCOs systematically
erect for physicians. And MCO "gag clauses" in physician contracts, in states where they
are not yet banned, will forbid physicians from discussing these conflicts. See supra note
36. Even where a "gag clause" is not in play, it is a tall order to expect physicians to
broach their fundamental conflicts as set up by the employing organization. Most impor-
tantly, the incentives in MCOs will discourage treatment, often without the patient ever
realizing that a relevant treatment has not been discussed or offered. Cf AMA Report,
supra note 37, at 333-35 (condemning incentives that discourage appropriate and inap-
propriate treatment alike).
43. See, e.g., E. HAAvi MoRREIm, BALANCING AcT: THE NEW MEDICAL ETHics OF
MEDICINE's NEW ECONOMICS (1995); Carolyn M. Clancy & Howard Brody, Managed Care:
Jekyll or Hyde?, 273 JAMA 338 (1995); AMA Report, supra note 37; Ezekiel J. Emanuel,
Medical Ethics in the Era of Managed Care: The Need for Institutional Structures Instead
of Principles for Individual Cases, 6 J. CLIN. ETHICS 335 (1995); Ezekiel J. Emanuel &
Nancy Neveloff Dubler, Preserving the Physician-Paticnt Relationship in the Era of Man-
aged Care, 273 JAMA 323 (1995); Rodwin, Conflicts in Managed Care, supra note 39;
Wolf, Health Care Reform and the Future of Physician Ethics, supra note 41.
44. AMA Report, supra note 37, at 332-35.
45. Id. at 333-35.
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whether MCOs as health care organizations have any ethical
obligations of their own.4 Both controversies rage.
What is known is that the financial incentives work. The
incentives are correlated with changes in physician behavior.47
Additionally, it is known that MCOs create a practice environ-
ment placing great emphasis on cost-containment.4' The issue
now is what is this likely to mean for the practice of physician-
assisted suicide?
It may mean a great deal. The bulk of patients who currently
express interest in assisted suicide have cancer or AIDS.49 Both
of these illnesses are expensive to treat and can extend for quite
some time. It is common for patients with these and other seri-
ous diagnoses to have thoughts about suicide, assisted suicide,
and euthanasia.5"
Working with a patient who has cancer, AIDS, or any life-
threatening condition can be challenging for a physician.
51 If
assisted suicide were legalized, however, the challenges would be
even greater. 52 The physician would have to determine when, if
ever, to raise the possibility of assisted suicide with the patient.
Should the physician wait for the patient to raise the issue or
mention assisted suicide as one of a number of treatment
options? And if the patient, like many, raises the issue of
assisted suicide while initially staggering under the burden of a
devastating diagnosis, or later when the pain relief stops work-
46. See, e.g., AMA Report, supra note 37, at 334-35; Nancy S. Jecker, Business
Ethics and the Ethics of Managed Care, 10 TRENDS HEALTH CARE L. & ETHICS 53 (1995);
Wolf, Health Care Reform and the Future of Physician Ethics, supra note 41, at 37-38.
47. See Hillman et al., supra note 31. Cf Bruce J. Hillman et al., Physicians' Utili-
zation and Charges for Outpatient Diagnostic Imaging in a Medicare Population, 268
JAMA 2050 (1992) (providing that physician part-ownership of a facility affects the physi-
cian's rate of patient referral to that facility); Jean M. Mitchell & Elton Scott, Physician
Ownership of Physical Therapy Services: Effects on Charges, Utilization, Profits, and Ser-
vice Characteristics, 268 JAMA 2055 (1992).
48. See generally SHOULDICE, supra note 26, at 18.
49. See Anthony L. Black et al., Physician-Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in
Washington State, 275 JAMA 919, 921 (1996) (physicians reporting that among patients
who were terminal, i.e., expected to live less than six months, most (73%) who requested
assisted suicide or euthanasia had cancer or AIDS); cf. Paul J. van der Maas et al., Eutha-
nasia and Other Medical Decisions Concerning the End of Life, 338 LANCET 669, 672
(1991) (noting that 68% of those euthanized and 54% of those who died by assisted suicide
in the Netherlands had cancer).
50. See, e.g., Black et al., supra note 49, at 923-24; William Breitbart et al., Interest
in Physician-Assisted Suicide Among Ambulatory HIV-Infected Patients, 153 AM. J. PsY.
cHLATRY 238 (1996).
51. See, e.g., ROBERT A. BURT, TAMNG CARE OF STRANGERS (1979); JAY KATZ, THE
SnENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1984).




ing, or perhaps when the MCO denies coverage for a treatment
or hospice, what should the physician's response be?
For a physician faced with a patient considering assisted sui-
cide, the incentives MCOs use would reward the physician for
encouraging the act. Those incentives would discourage and
even penalize a physician for offering yet another treatment pos-
sibility to the patient, devoting substantial resources to working
out a new pain relief or palliative care regimen, or fighting for
the patient's access to that treatment or hospice. Even if assisted
suicide were instituted with safeguards such as a required sec-
ond opinion or psychiatric consult, it would still likely be less
costly than those alternatives. Thus, it is not surprising to see a
study find that physicians with a cost-conserving style report
greater willingness to assist patients' suicides.
5 3
Certainly, some physicians would resist the managed care
incentives to encourage assisted suicide, whether out of rejection
of assisted suicide or commitment to try nonfatal alternatives
with the patient first. Similarly, some physicians undoubtedly
resist the incentive structure of managed care and loyally advo-
cate for their patients. Indeed, the debate on the ethics of man-
aged care includes pleas to physicians to remember that they are
professionals with ethical obligations that cannot be bargained
away. Whether those professional obligations or the conflicting
demands of MCOs will win out, however, is precisely the ques-
tion.54 In any case, one cannot build an acceptable system of
patient care on the moral sainthood of the few.55 One certainly
could not rely on those few for adequate protections against
abuse and error, if all physicians were empowered to assist
suicide.
Beyond the general danger of assisted suicide being
encouraged and embraced as a cost-saving measure, there is a
particular danger for vulnerable subpopulations. It is well docu-
mented in studies of medical care generally that certain groups
have less satisfactory doctor-patient relationships and receive
inferior care. A The fact that African Americans and women are
among these groups should come as no surprise, as it simply
53. See Linas et al., supra note 21.
54. Analysts have been arguing for some time that physicians are being deprofes-
sionalized. See, e.g., John B. McKinlay & John D. Stoeckle, Corporatization and the
Social Transformation of Doctoring, 18 IN'r'L J. HEALTH SERV. 191 (1988).
55. Cf Susan Wolf, Moral Saints, 79 J. PHmI. 419 (1982) (a philosopher arguing the
actual undesirability of moral sainthood).
56. See, e.g., Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical Associa-
tion, Black-White Disparities in Health Care, 263 JAMA 2344 (1990); Council on Ethical
and Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association, Gender Disparities in Clinical Deci-
sion Making, 266 JAMA 559 (1991).
1996 465
Duquesne Law Review
means that medicine is not exempt from broader social dynamics
and the burden of history. Studies focusing on MCOs, however,
add another layer of concern. A recent study, for example, docu-
ments that elderly and poor patients have worse physical health
outcomes in HMOs than in fee-for-service systems. 7 Those
patients "who were younger, relatively healthy, and relatively
well-off financially" did well in HMOs, but the "elderly and poor
were more than twice as likely to decline" in an HMO than fee-
for-service plan.58
This raises the concern that MCOs would do more than
heighten the risk of error and abuse in assisted suicide for all
patients through the incentives and conflicts created. MCOs
may differentially raise the risk of vulnerable groups. The eld-
erly and poor "account for a disproportionate share of health care
expenditures and are, therefore, prime targets of cost contain-
ment."5 9 This suggests that those individuals would also have
heightened risk of being urged toward assisted suicide rather
than toward the costly care they would otherwise merit.
II. SYSTEMIC NEGLECT
Beyond the general characteristics of MCOs that would pro-
vide incentives for physicians and patients to embrace assisted
suicide, there are indications that MCOs have an inferior track
record in responding to depression, the leading problem moving
patients to consider assisted suicide. Thus, quite apart from the
question of physician incentives and conflicts, there is reason to
worry that MCOs may not adequately treat an important risk
factor for assisted suicide. MCOs may thus drive patients to
assisted suicide through systemic neglect.
To examine this, the reasons why patients seek assisted sui-
cide must first be considered. A number of studies have analyzed
why patients in the United States request assisted suicide or say
that they would want it in the future. These studies come to sim-
ilar conclusions. A Massachusetts survey of cancer patients
found that the "patients who had seriously considered and pre-
pared for euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide were signifi-
cantly more likely to be depressed," while "[platients
experiencing pain were not inclined to" either practice.60 A New
57. John E. Ware, Jr. et al., Differences in 4-Year Health Outcomes for Elderly and
Poor, Chronically Ill Patients Treated in HMO and Fee-for-Service Systems, 276 JAMA
1039 (1996).
58. Id. at 1046.
59. Id. at 1040.
60. Ezekiel J. Emanuel et al., Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide: Atti-
tudes and Experiences of Oncology Patients, Oncologists, and the Public, 347 LANCET
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York study of HIV-infected patients found that those "who
expressed interest in physician-assisted suicide reported signifi-
cantly more depressive symptoms, had higher levels of hopeless-
ness and endorsed more symptoms of global psychological
distress."6' The researchers, however, discovered no "significant
relationships between interest in physician-assisted suicide and
pain or other physical variables."6 2
These results are largely consistent with those from a survey
of physicians in Washington State.63 Focusing on physicians who
had received patient requests for assisted suicide or euthanasia
and on the physicians' judgments of why the patients made these
requests, the researchers found that the primary patient con-
cerns were nonphysical. The researchers reported that, "[a]s
judged by their physicians, patients were most frequently wor-
ried about losing control, being a burden, being dependent, and
losing dignity. .. ."64 Additionally, in descending order of impor-
tance, patients were worried about being bedridden, depression,
suffering, physical discomfort other than pain, pain, and costs.
65
Moreover, the studies of why patients choose assisted suicide
or euthanasia in the Netherlands are generally in line with the
U.S. data in showing that pain is not the primary reason. Dutch
researchers studying physicians' assessments of patients' rea-
sons found that pain was a reason in less than half the cases.6
Indeed, "[i]n only [ten] .. .cases was pain the only reason. "67
1805, 1809 (1996). These findings on the importance of depression are consistent with
studies of suicidality among patients with cancer and the terminally ill. The comparison
merits caution, since desire for suicide may not be the same as desire for physician-
assisted suicide. Cf. Breitbart et al., supra note 50, at 241 (analyzing the overlap, but
concluding that "interest in physician-assisted suicide and suicidal ideation [are not]
identical constructs"). However, studies of the former similarly point to the importance of
clinical depression. See James Henderson Brown et al., Is It Normal for Terminally Ill
Patients to Desire Death?, 143 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 208 (1986); Harvey Max Chochinov et
al., Desire for Death in the Terminally Ill, 152 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1185 (1995); D.
Saltzburg et al., The Relationship of Pain and Depression to Suicidal Ideation in Cancer
Patients, 8 PRoc. ASCO 312 (1989) (abstract).
61. Breitbart et al., supra note 50, at 240.
62. Id. at 241.
63. Black et al., supra note 49.
64. Id. at 921. A Utah study asking relatives and other survivors after a patient's
death whether the decedent would have wanted assisted suicide or euthanasia similarly
found that a positive answer was associated largely with nonphysical concerns ("religion,
religiosity, type of illness, and certain life situations"), rather than with "inadequate com-
fort measures or pain control." Jay A. Jacobson et al., Decedents'Reported Preferences for
Physician-Assisted Death: A Survey of Informants Listed on Death Certificates in Utah, 6
J. CLIN. ETHICS 149, 150 (1995).
65. Id. at 922.
66. van der Maas et al., supra note 49, at 672.
67. Id.
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A second team of Dutch researchers surveyed family physi-
cians and obtained similar results.6 The physicians reported
that the patients' reasons for requesting assisted suicide or
euthanasia included "[flutile suffering" in over half the cases.
When researchers asked which was the most important reason,
"[f]utile suffering," humiliation, and "[u]nbearable suffering"
were on top, pain was in sixth place, and "[flear of/avoidance of
pain" was last.69 A survey of nursing home physicians likewise
found that the main reasons reported for patients' requests con-
cerned fear of deterioration, fear of suffocation, suffering, and
only then pain. 0
Both the Dutch and U.S. studies thus indicate that depression
and nonphysical factors are more important in motivating
patients to request assisted suicide and euthanasia than pain
and other physical symptoms. 71 The latter concerns, however,
remain relevant. A substantial body of published work supports
the inclusion of uncontrolled pain and physical symptoms on the
list of reasons why patients may wish assisted suicide, even if
these symptoms are not at the top of that list.
72
All of this raises the question of how well MCOs handle the
type of problems that apparently motivate patients to seek
assisted suicide. Consolidating the list of problems researchers
have identified yields three categories: depression, suffering, and
pain. Comparing the performance of MCOs to fee-for-service sys-
tems in dealing with these problems is not simple; there are tre-
68. G. van der Wal et al., Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide. II. Do Dutch Family
Doctors Act Prudently?, 9 FAm. PRAc. 135 (1992).
69. Id. at 138.
70. M. T. Muller et al., Voluntary Active Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Sui-
cide in Dutch Nursing Homes: Are the Requirements for Prudent Practice Properly Met?,
42 J. AM. GERIATRICS Soc. 624, 626 (1994). The full roster of reasons named (apart from
how often each was the "main" reason) was: "Unbearable suffering" (53%); "Hopeless suf-
fering" (49%); "Fear of/avoidance of deterioration of condition" (40%); "Fear of further suf-
fering" (28%); "Fear of suffocation" (28%); "Pain" (29%); "Not wanting to be dependent on
others any longer" (24%); "I'ired of life" (19%); "Fear of/prevention of pain" (6%); "Not
wanting to be a burden on relatives any longer" (4%); and "Other" (18%). Id.
71. Unfortunately, neither set of Dutch researchers included "depression" as one of
their categories, to aid cross-cultural comparison. Some of the categories reported, such
as "W[t]iredness of life" may be linked to depression, but one cannot tell. However, the
controversial case of Dr. Chabot, a psychiatrist who assisted the suicide of a physically
healthy but depressed patient, made public the question of whether depression was ade-
quate reason for assisting suicide in the Netherlands. For commentary, see, e.g., Alan D.
Ogilvie & S. G. Potts, Assisted Suicide for Depression: The Slippery Slope in Action?, 309
BRr. MED. J. 492 (1994).
72. See, e.g., Walter F. Baile et al., The Request for Assistance in Dying: The Need
for Psychiatric Evaluation, 72 CANCER 2786 (1993); Nathan I. Cherny et al., The Treat-
ment of Suffering When Patients Request Elective Death, 10 J. PALuIATrvE CARE 71 (1994);
Kathleen M. Foley, The Relationship of Pain and Symptom Management to Patient
Requests for Physician-Assisted Suicide, 6 J. PAiN & SYMpToM MGmT. 289 (1991).
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mendous debates about how to measure health care quality.73
Thus some studies focus on which patient population gets more
services, while others try to compare treatment outcomes.74 Yet,
the literature bearing on these three problems teaches some les-
sons, especially the literature on depression.
Certainly there are interventions at which MCOs seem to
excel, such as various forms of preventive screening.78 When it
comes to treatment of depression, however, there is evidence that
MCOs fall short. In general, "[d]epression... is associated with
high rates of service utilization and therefore high costs."
76
Thus, one would expect health plans that emphasize cost con-
tainment to approach it somewhat differently.
That is indeed what one sees. Evaluating treatment of depres-
sion entails analysis of detection rates, the treatment provided,
and outcomes. Wells et al. have assessed detection in three dif-
ferent practice settings, all of which included at least some prac-
titioners being paid on a prepaid basis, thus creating incentives
to limit treatment. 77 They found that "patients... receiving pre-
paid care were less likely to have their depression detected or
treated."78 Somewhat lower detection rates are cited elsewhere
as well.79
Once detected, the way depression is treated appears to be dif-
ferent in managed care settings. Researchers have found that
prepaid plans control the costs of outpatient mental health care
through "fewer visits per user and. . .greater reliance on
group... therapy and on nonphysician providers."80 Stewart et
al. comment on substantial differences in treatment style, with
HMOs providing "much less intensive and less costly" treat-
73. This author reviews much of this literature in Susan M. Wolf, Quality Assess-
ment of Ethics in Health Care: The Accountability Revolution, 20 AM. J. L. & MED. 105
(1994).
74. Compare, e.g., Kenneth B. Wells et al., Use of Outpatient Mental Health Serv-
ices in HMO and Fee-for-Service Plans: Results from a Randomized Controlled Trial, 21
HEALTH SERVICES RES. 453 (1986) with William H. Rogers et al., Outcomes for Adult Out-
patients with Depression Under Prepaid or Fee-for-Service Financing, 50 ARcHrVEs GEN.
PSYCmATRY 517 (1993).
75. See Robert H. Miller & Harold S. Left, Managed Care Plan Performance Since
1980: A Literature Analysis, 271 JAMA 1512 (1994).
76. Roland Sturm et al., Mental Health Care Utilization in Prepaid and Fee-for-
Service Plans Among Depressed Patients in the Medical Outcomes Study, 30 HEALTH
SERvicEs RES. 319, 320 (1995) (citations omitted).
77. Kenneth B. Wells et al., Detection of Depressive Disorder for Patients Receiving
Prepaid or Fee-for-Service Care, 262 JAMA 3298 (1989).
78. Id. at 3300.
79. See, e.g., Kenneth B. Wells & Roland Sturm, Care for Depression in a Changing
Environment, HEALTH AsF,, Fall 1995, at 78, 84-85.
80. Rogers et al., supra note 74, at 517 (citing Wells et al., supra note 74). See also
Sturm et al., supra note 76, at 321.
1996 469
Duquesne Law Review
ment.8 ' The Sturm et al. study found that "depressed prepaid
patients obtained substantially fewer mental health services
than similar patients in fee-for-service care."82
Turning to outcomes, Rogers et al. found that outcomes were
worse for depressed patients of psychiatrists with prepaid rather
than fee-for-service financing. 3 This contrasted with a lack of
outcome differences for patients receiving nonpsychiatrist care, a
population that the researchers interpreted to have less psycho-
logical sickness.84 Consequently, the different mix of providers
offered by MCOs seems significant.8 5 Indeed, a number of
authors report suicides and attempted suicides among managed
care patients facing barriers to more intensive care. 6
Thus, the picture is not reassuring when one considers how
well MCOs are doing in treating depression. What about treat-
ment of suffering and pain? Here, the evidence is more sketchy.
Assessing managed care's treatment of suffering is difficult.
"Suffering" includes a wide range of phenomena, from physical
discomfort that is not pain (such as nausea or shortness of
breath), to suffering over the conditions of one's existence (such
as dismay over being bedridden), to suffering in a more spiritual
sense (such as over the perceived meaninglessness of one's life).
Thus, comparing MCOs with fee-for-service along this dimension
would be an ambitious undertaking, which is not yet reflected in
the literature. The literature does shed light on the accessibility
of hospice, however, which is a treatment modality that special-
izes in addressing suffering as well as pain at the end of a
patient's life. 7
This literature suggests that although a hospice benefit is
increasingly available within MCOs, it is not universally avail-
81. Anita L. Stewart et al., Do Depressed Patients in Different Treatment Settings
Have Different Levels of Well-Being and Functioning?, 61 J. CONSULTING & CLIN.
PSYCHOL. 849, 849 (1993).
82. Sturm et al., supra note 76, at 332.
83. Rogers et al., supra note 74.
84. See also Wells & Sturm, supra note 79, at 84-85. Similarly, Ware et al. do not
find differences in mental health outcomes for chronically ill patients in HMO and fee-for-
service settings, but they do not report analyses by type of provider and they note signifi-
cant variation by HMO. Ware et al., supra note 57, at 1044.
85. See Stewart et al., supra note 81.
86. See David J. Rissmiller et al., Factors Complicating Cost Containment in the
Treatment of Suicidal Patients, 45 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYcHIATRY 782, 784 (1994) (cit-
ing Daniel B. Borenstein, Managed Care: A Means of Rationing Psychiatric Treatment, 41
Hosp. & COMMUNITY PsycmATRY 1095 (1990); Nicole Lurie et al., Does Capitation Affect
the Health of the Chronically Mentally Ill? Results from a Randomized Trial, 267 JAMA
3300 (1992); J. Westermeyer, Problems with Managed Psychiatric Care Without a Psychi-
atrist-Manager, 42 Hosp. & CoMMuNrrY PSYCmATRY 1221 (1991)).




able.s8 Moreover, mere approval of a patient's entrance into a
hospice program does not guarantee the MCO will then approve
specific treatments for the patient that may be relevant.8 9 In
addition, MCO coverage of hospice has been attributed to the
cost savings that can be realized by steering terminally ill
patients away from acute hospital care to hospice care.9° Yet,
there is a growing debate on whether hospice care indeed gener-
ates significant savings at the end of life.91 This raises the ques-
tion of whether MCO enthusiasm for hospice care may dampen
in the future, and hospice benefits decrease. None of this analy-
sis is a substitute for an in-depth empirical picture of how well
MCOs do in providing hospice benefits and more broadly in
addressing patient suffering. It does suggest, however, that one
area of concern is whether MCOs will continue to regard hospice
coverage as in their financial interests.
Finally, research on access to pain relief is still in its infancy.
The Cancer Pain Panel of the United States Agency for Health
Care Policy and Research reported in 1994 that "[c]ost issues
have been minimally explored," in part because pain relief in the
past was limited to oral administration or intramuscular injec-
tion of medication, which are both relatively inexpensive.92 The
inadequacy of the old approach has been documented, with large
numbers of patients undermedicated and many experiencing
substantial pain.9 3 Pain relief has thus now become a focus for
research and far more sophisticated. As two authors have noted:
"Current treatment options for cancer pain. . .range from the
orally administered opioid to the epidural opioid with an
implanted infusion device."94
Just as research on pain is in its infancy, research on how well
or poorly MCOs do in treating pain similarly seems to be at an
88. See Judith Randall, Hospice Services Feel the Pinch of Managed Care, 88 J.
NAT'L CANCER INST. 860 (1996). Note that Medicare offers a hospice benefit to covered
patients. See Rhymes, supra note 87, at 369.
89. See Scott Becker & Robert J. Pristave, Managed Care and the Provision of Hos-
pice Care, 3 MANAGED CARE Q. 39, 42 (1995); Randall, supra note 88, at 861.
90. See id. at 39, 42.
91. See, e.g., Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Cost Savings at the End of Life: What Do the Data
Show?, 275 JAMA 1907 (1996).
92. Betty R. Ferrell & Hurdis Griffith, Cost Issues Related to Pain Management:
Report from the Cancer Pain Panel of the Agency for Health Care Policy and Research, 9 J.
PAne & SYmprOM MGmT. 221, 222 (1994).
93. See, e.g., Charles S. Cleeland et al., Pain and Its Treatment in Outpatients with
Metastatic Cancer, 330 NEw ENGL. J. MED. 592, 593, 595 (1994); The SUPPORT Principal
Investigators, A Controlled Trial to Improve Care for Seriously Ill Hospitalized Patients:
The Study to Understand Prognoses and Preferences for Outcomes and Risks of Treatment
(SUPPORT), 274 JAMA 1591, 1595 (1995), and Correction, 275 JAMA 1232 (1996).
94. Ferrell & Griffith, supra note 92, at 222.
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early point.95  It is clear that "HMOs' outpatient prescription
drug benefits frequently are subject to restrictions. . .such as
generic substitution, therapeutic substitution, and [limited] for-
mularies."96 Moreover, these benefits may be available in some
HMOs only by subscriber purchase of an extra "rider" to the cov-
erage contract,97 and coverage affects access to pain-relieving
drugs. 98 Much remains to be determined about the effectiveness
of MCOs in addressing pain, however, especially for patients at
the end of life.
The above analysis thus suggests that there is documented
reason for concern about MCOs' treatment of depression. This
raises the fear that MCO patients will be differentially driven to
assisted suicide by systemic neglect, since depression is the pri-
mary reason patients seek assisted suicide. Data on treatment of
suffering and pain are less clear, but the adequacy of MCO cover-
age may have much to do with whether such treatment is seen as
worth the cost to the organization.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
What do these features of managed care, physician incentives
to encourage assisted suicide and systemic failures that may
drive patients to assisted suicide, suggest both for constitutional
analysis of assisted suicide and for the legislatures' and public's
policy analyses? On the constitutional front, these features first
suggest that even if the Ninth Circuit's finding of a patient's con-
stitutionally protected liberty interest in assisted suicide stands,
the court's analysis of the state's countervailing interests is seri-
ously mistaken. The court acknowledges that the state has clear
countervailing interests in preserving life, preventing suicide,
and precluding undue influence by third parties.9 9 The court,
however, then finds physician involvement in the process to be a
great safeguard, a bulwark against abuse and error.
The court's outdated reliance on assumptions about physician
behavior and the doctor-patient relationship that are under fron-
tal attack in managed care makes its analysis unpersuasive.
Instead, examination of the incentives in managed care versus
95. See David Joranson, Are Health Care Reimbursement Policies a Barrier to
Acute and Cancer Pain Management?, 9 J. PAe & SYMP'OM MGMT. 244, 249 (1994);
Jonathan P. Weiner et al., Impact of Managed Care on Prescription Drug Use, HEALTH
AFF., Spring 1991, at 140.
96. Maren Anderson & Jonathan Dunn, Disclosure of Outpatient Prescription Drug
Benefits in HMOs, HEALTH AFF., Summer 1991, at 143, 143.
97. See Joranson, supra note 95, at 249.
98. See id.
99. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 816.
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fee-for-service paints a sharp contrast. Under the incentives in a
fee-for-service system, physicians profit by offering patients
treatments for their illness, interventions for their depression,
pain relief, and encouragement to go on with life if possible.
Under managed care incentives, physicians and organizations
lose money by doing all of these things and profit instead by
encouraging patients considering assisted suicide to go ahead
with the practice.
Constitutional analysis must rest on the realities of the U.S.
health care system as it exists now rather than as it was and
may be nostalgically remembered. These realities mean that the
states have acute countervailing interests in protecting against
error and abuse. In an era of managed care, physician involve-
ment, far from being a safeguard, would be very much part of the
problem.
Rigorous state regulation of assisted suicide should thus be
easy to justify. The question is whether this regulation would
conceivably be enough. Given the pervasiveness of managed care
and managed care techniques, it is not at all clear that anything
short of a ban on assisted suicide can succeed in preventing the
use of the practice as subtle or overt cost-containment. Here,
Kamisar's long-standing concern that it is simply impossible to
devise safeguards that are both workable and adequately protec-
tive applies.1°°
One might reply to this by stating that the same concerns
apply to the termination of life-sustaining treatment yet the
Supreme Court in Cruzan nonetheless suggested that one can
infer from past opinions a constitutionally protected right to
refuse treatment. Certainly, error and abuse are concerns in the
termination of treatment realm as well. Thus, the courts rou-
tinely recognize that the states have countervailing interests in
that realm. Indeed, the majority in Cruzan found that Missouri's
countervailing interests permitted the state to protect an incom-
petent patient by denying the patient's surrogates the authority
to terminate the patient's artificial nutrition absent "clear and
convincing" prior instructions from the patient.
However, there are substantial differences between the
problems surrounding assisted suicide and those surrounding
termination of treatment, especially in the context of managed
care. Systems and physicians driven by cost containment are
likely to find assisted suicide much more tempting than termina-
tion of treatment for several reasons.
100. See Yale Kamisar, Some Non.Religious Views Against Proposed "Mercy-Kill-
ing" Legislation, 42 MINN. L. REv. 969 (1958).
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First, patients may raise the possibility of suicide and assisted
suicide early in the disease process. Indeed, it may be prompted
by the initial announcement to the patient of a frightening diag-
nosis. Thus physician incentives and systemic biases may begin
to play a part in encouraging assisted suicide early. Indeed, if a
patient concludes that the best way out is assisted suicide, the
patient must act while still competent and able to commit
suicide.
In contrast, the largest empirical study to date of patient care
at the end of life and forgoing treatment showed that, for seri-
ously ill patients, "discussions and decisions substantially in
advance of death were uncommon. Nearly half of all DNR [do
not resuscitate] orders were written in the last two days of
life."10' In fact, the researchers' effort to devise an intervention
to promote earlier decisions failed. 02 There is further evidence
that most decisions to forgo treatment are effectuated late in the
disease course, after the patient has lost competence.
0 3 Of
course, some patients may consider forgoing treatment early,
and perhaps complete an advance directive while still competent.
The data indicate, however, that a minority of Americans com-
plete advance directives,0 4 despite Congressional enactment of
the Patient Self-Determination Act which encourages their
use. 10 5 Consensus is also emerging that advance directives are
not big cost-savers within the health care system. 0 6 Thus, a
rational physician and MCO should have little financial incen-
101. The SUPPORT Principal Investigators, supra note 93, at 1595.
102. See id. at 1596.
103. See Nicholas G. Smedira et al., Withholding and Withdrawal of Life Support
from the Critically Ill, 322 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 309 (1990). Note that this is a study of
patients admitted to intensive care units (ICUs) and so underrepresents those who forgo
treatment and die without admission to an ICU.
104. See, e.g., Ezekiel J. Emanuel et al., How Well Is the Patient Self-Determination
Act Working? An Early Assessment, 95 Am. J. MED. 619 (1993).
105. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508 §§4206,
4751, 104 Stat. 1388-115, 1388-204 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C., especially
§§ 1395cc, 1396a).
106. For a comprehensive analysis, see Emanuel, Cost Savings at the End of Life,
supra note 91. See also Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Linda L. Emanuel, The Economics of
Dying: The Illusion of Cost Savings at the End of Life, 330 NEw ENGL. J. MED. 540 (1994);
Lawrence J. Schneiderman et al., Effects of Offering Advance Directives on Medical Treat-
ments and Costs, 117 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 599 (1992); J. Teno et al., Do Advance
Directives Save Resources?, 41 CLuN. RES. 551A (1993); Joan M. Teno et al., Do Formal
Advance Directives Affect Resuscitation Decisions and the Use of Resources for Seriously
Ill Patients?, 5 J. CLIN. ETHIcs 23 (1994); The SUPPORT Principal Investigators, supra
note 93. But see Christopher V. Chambers et al., Relationship of Advance Directives to
Hospital Charges in a Medicare Population, 154 Aacmvs INTERNAL MED. 541 (1994);
William B. Weeks et al., Advance Directives and the Cost of Terminal Hospitalization, 154
ARcmvEs INTERNAL MED. 2077 (1994) (both analyzed and reconciled by Emanuel, Cost
Savings at the End of Life).
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tive to push patients to consider forgoing life-sustaining treat-
ment in advance, at least by an advance directive.
Certainly competent patients can forgo treatment verbally
without an advance directive. 1 7 As noted above, however, that is
likely to happen late in the course of illness. Even analysis that
goes beyond advance directives to project cost savings from hos-
pice or denial of futile care, however, has concluded those savings
are modest at best. 0 8 In part, this may be because patients who
forgo life-sustaining treatment "do not necessarily require less
medical care, just a different kin..... [and] [h]igh-quality pallia-
tive care...is...costly."
10 9
Moreover, as noted above, by the time a competent patient's
decision to forgo treatment has to be effectuated, it is likely that
the patient will have lost competence. At that point, the physi-
cian can no longer "push" the patient to decide anything.
Instead, the physician is required to collaborate with the
patient's surrogate to make decisions. Even though both the
physician and the surrogate should ordinarily honor past choices
by the patient, commentators routinely note that the ultimate
choice may be different from what the patient contemplated." 0
Moreover, indications are that many patients may want their
surrogate to consider their past choices only as general gui-
dance.'" Thus, the surrogate may have considerable latitude.
Since the surrogate is not the one suffering from disease, depres-
sion, pain, or the like, the surrogate is far more likely to be able
to hold his or her own with the physician.
Finally, decisions about whether to use or forgo treatment of
all sorts are intrinsic to health care. Patients and physicians
make such decisions every day. Two decades ago, when litigation
first erupted about forgoing life-sustaining treatment," 2 the
basic question was whether the long-established principles gov-
erning refusal of other treatment apply even when the predicted
consequence of honoring the refusal is the patient's death. The
107. There is some indication that achieving agreement between physician and
patient on the patient's choice to forgo cardiopulmonary resuscitation can save money.
See Joan M. Teno et al., Preferences for Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation: Physician-
Patient Agreement and Hospital Resource Use, 10 JGIM 179 (1995).
108. See, e.g., Emanuel, Cost Savings at the End of Life, supra note 91; Emanuel &
Emanuel, The Economics of Dying, supra note 106.
109. Emanuel & Emanuel, The Economics of Dying, supra note 106, at 543.
110. See, e.g., Susan M. Wolf et al., Sources of Concern About the Patient Self-Deter-
mination Act, 325 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 1666 (1991).
111. See Ashwini Sehgal, How Strictly Do Dialysis Patients Want Advance Direc-
tives Followed?, 267 JAMA 59 (1992).
112. See In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert. denied sub noam., Garger v. New
Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
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courts, ethicists, and clinicians have clearly answered yes to this
question. Decisions about whether to forgo life-sustaining treat-
ment are an integral part of caring for terminally ill patients.
That is not to say all problems are solved, but that a vast litera-
ture evidences the integration of forgoing treatment into the
approaches governing clinical practice generally. Physicians
must honor patients' refusal of any unwanted bodily invasion.
The usual rules and ethics governing doctor-patient relation-
ships apply.
This is not so, however, in the case of assisted suicide.
Whether one favors or opposes its legalization, the practice
clearly represents a departure from the past ethics of the doctor-
patient relationship. The physician is not honoring a patient's
refusal of bodily invasion. Indeed, the physician is breaching the
Hippocratic injunction to "give no deadly drug, even if asked."
113
This does not mean the practice cannot be legalized. It means
that it does not fit into the general practice of medicine, and that
the ethics otherwise governing the doctor-patient relationship
will not help the physician in this case. Physicians are not nor-
mally trained to deliberately take life or to help the patient in
taking his or her own life.
Thus the physician facing the incentives and ethical conflicts
imposed by managed care will far more easily resort to the tradi-
tional ethics of the doctor-patient relationship to guide termina-
tion of treatment than assisted suicide. Physicians' traditional
obligations to place patients' need first have a fighting chance of
prevailing when the question is forgoing treatment. They have
less of a chance when the question is whether to supply drugs or
other means to the patient in order to help the patient commit
suicide.
All of this suggests that physician incentives and systemic
biases in favor of forgoing treatment in MCOs will be much less
threatening than the incentives to assist suicide. State counter-
vailing interests in the case of assisted suicide will be substan-
tially greater than those in the termination of treatment area.
This analysis assumes so far that future courts, most impor-
tantly the Supreme Court, may get to the point of considering the
state's countervailing interests by finding a constitutionally pro-
tected right to be free to seek assisted suicide. This article puts
aside, but the author elsewhere develops at length, the argument
that there is no such protected liberty interest. 114 Nothing in the
113. See Kass, supra note 1.
114. See Wolf, Physician.Assisted Suicide, Abortion, and Treatment Refusal, supra
note 2.
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text of the Constitution protects such a right. Nor does prece-
dent support a right to invade a patient's body in order to end the
patient's life. Cruzan concerns a right to be free of unwanted
bodily invasion, and most of the Justices' opinions in Cruzan
make clear they are writing about bodily invasion.11 5 Indeed,
Justice O'Connor, later writing for the governing plurality in
Casey in a portion of the opinion joined by two further Justices,
states that the liberty interest in abortion "stands at the inter-
section of two lines of decisions."" 6 The first line has to do with
procreation, and includes cases based on "the liberty relating to
intimate relationships, the family, and decisions about
whether.. .to beget or bear a child."" 7 The second line, however,
which is more relevant to assisted suicide, relates to end-of-life
issues. Here, liberty concerns "personal autonomy and bodily
integrity."-" This is where the Justice cites Cruzan. Therefore,
Casey reinforces rather than undermines the notion that Cruzan
protects a right to be free of bodily invasion. Broad language in
Casey on Fourteenth Amendment protection of "intimate and
personal choices"" 9 relates to the long line of precedent on pro-
creative choice, not the end-of-life precedent most germane to
assisted suicide.
115. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court in Cruzan, conceded: "The prin-
ciple that a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing
unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions." Cruzan v. Direc-
tor, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (199.0). He repeatedly framed the protected
interest as one in refusing treatment, and stated that it was "the forced administration
of.. .treatment" that implicated the interest. Id. at 279.
Justice O'Connor's concurrence similarly stated that "[tihe liberty interest in
refusing medical treatment flows from decisions involving the State's invasions into the
body.... Because our notions of liberty are inextricably entwined with our idea of physi-
cal freedom and self-determination, the Court has often deemed state incursions into the
body repugnant to the.. .Due Process Clause." Id. at 287 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (cita-
tions omitted).
Justice Brennan in dissent, joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun, also
emphasized a 'fundamental right to be free of unwanted" treatment. Id. at 302 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting). He proclaimed the "inviolability of the person." Id. at 305 (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Thus, Justice Brennan found "a right to evaluate...
treatment ... and ... [decide] whether to subject oneself to the intrusion." Id. at 309
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
Justice Stevens's dissent emphasized, too, that at stake was "[h]ighly invasive
treatment." Id. at 339 (Stevens, J., dissenting). His broader language about "the liberty
to make. . .choices constitutive of private life" and his assertion that "[c]hoices about
death touch the core of liberty," is married to language on "rights pertaining to bodily
integrity" and the right to be free from "physically invasive" procedures. Id. at 341-43
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
116. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 857 (1992).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 851.
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Thus, this article's managed care analysis, indicating that the
state's countervailing interests are greater in the case of assisted
suicide than treatment termination, takes place against the
background of strong constitutional support for a right to be free
of unwanted invasive treatment but dubious support for a right
to assisted suicide.
The contrast between assisted suicide and termination of
treatment shows as well why the Second Circuit overlooked a
critical element in Quill. The Second Circuit, like the Ninth Cir-
cuit, completely ignored the realities of current health care and
the rise of managed care. In finding that the state's difference in
approach to termination of treatment and assisted suicide was
"not rationally related to some legitimate state interest,"120 the
court failed to analyze the greater physician incentives and sys-
temic bias in the case of assisted suicide. Moreover, by ignoring
the managed care context, the court never considered whether
widespread concern about managed care and demands for the
states to regulate MCOs in ways far more protective of
patients121 could ground special state concerns over assisted sui-
cide in MCOs. Finally, in opining that the state could simply
establish "procedures to assure that all choices are free of...
pressures,"22 the court never acknowledged the problem of devis-
ing adequate procedures in the era of managed care.
Constitutional analysis, whether following the Ninth Circuit's
liberty reasoning or the Second Circuit's equal protection ration-
ale, cannot ignore the presence of managed care. Similarly, leg-
islatures and the public cannot ignore managed care when
determining whether to legalize assisted suicide. If the Supreme
Court rules that the Constitution encompasses no right to
assisted suicide, the individual states will then have to deter-
mine whether to legalize the practice. To consider this momen-
tous question without focusing on the realities of how health care
currently works would be an abdication of state responsibility
and public folly.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit extended Constitutional protection to
assisted suicide based on nostalgic fictions about the doctor-
patient relationship. The Second Circuit did little better. Both
courts simply ignored the growing dominance of managed care,
120. Quill, 80 F.3d at 729.
121. See Pear, Stakes High as California Debates Ballot Issues to Rein in H.M.O.'s,
supra note 3.
122. Id. at 730.
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the upheaval and challenge created, the physician incentives
that now prevail, and the organizational biases in place.
The questions of what state interests legitimately apply in the
case of assisted suicide, and whether the state rationally distin-
guishes between assisted suicide and termination of treatment,
have to be answered based on health care as it actually exists.
To ignore the problems posed by the growing prevalence of man-
aged care is a mistake. In the name of supposed individual
rights, it blesses a practice of assisted suicide driven by financial
incentives and the needs of health care organizations.

